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Casenotes
LIABILITY OF RESPONSIBLE PARTIES FOR HAZARDOUS
WASTE CLEANUP: CERCLA SECTION 107
LIABILITY AFTER ONE DECADE
I.

INTRODUCTION

Congress created the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) 1 in
response to the rapidly increasing amount of hazardous substances 2 being released into the environment. CERCLA grants
the President the authority3 to identify hazardous waste sites4 and
compel potentially liable parties 5 to pay for and conduct remedia1. On December 11, 1980, Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980. Pub. L. No. 96-5 10,
94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (generally codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 &
Supp. V 1987)) [hereinafter CERCLA]. On October 12, 1986, Congress passed
the Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99499, 100 Star. 1613 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. V
1987)) [hereinafter SARA]. The Act broadened the EPA's power to settle with
responsible parties and toughened hazardous waste clean up standards. Atkenson, Connors, Ellrod & Goldberg, An Annotated Legislative History of the Superfund
Amendments & Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,363-64 (Dec. 1986).
2. Under CERCLA section 10 1(14), a "hazardous substance" is defined as a
substance that has been identified as hazardous in other environmental statutes.
CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (Supp. V 1987).
3. CERCLA § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1982 & Supp. V 1987); CERCLA
§ 103(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(d)(1) (1982). In practice, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is vested with the authority, through the President, to
identify hazardous waste sites.
4. CERCLA section 103(d)(1) provides:
(1) The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations specifying, with respect
to-

(A) the location, tide, or condition of a facility, and
(B) the identity, characteristics, quantity, origin, or condition (including containerization and previous treatment) of any hazardous substances contained or deposited in a facility; the records which shall be
retained by any person required to provide the notification of a facility
set out in subsection (c) of this section. Such specification shall be in
accordance with the provisions of this subsection.
42 U.S.C. § 9603(d)(1).
5. CERCLA section 107(a) specifies who potentially may be held liable as a
party responsible for cleaning up a hazardous waste site. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
See infra note 22 for text of CERCLA section 107(a).
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tion efforts.
Although application of the statute appears to be routine,
questions arise concerning who is a "responsible party," and thus
potentially liable under CERCLA section 107. Included among
potentially responsible parties are current and past owners and
operators7 of facilities at which hazardous substances have been
released." A major source of controversy has arisen among different courts with regard9 to interpreting CERCLA's use of the terms
"owner or operator." How a court interprets "owner or operator" determines whether a party may or may not be liable for
clean up expenses. For example, in Edward Hines Lumber Co. v.
Vulcan Materials Co., 1o the Seventh Circuit construed the definition
of "owner or operator" narrowly in holding that a chemical supplier to a wood processing facility was not liable as an owner or
operator. "I
This Note discusses the creation and structure of CERCIA,
and then examines the interpretation of "owner or operator" in
light of recent court decisions.' 2 Finally, this Note illustrates the
possible effects a broad reading of section 107 would produce
and suggests means by which the statute may be clarified.

II. BACKGROUND
A.

Historical Overview and Structure of CERCLA
CERCLA was enacted in response to the large number of

6. CERCLA § 106, 42 U.S.C. § 9606. See infra note 23. For a thorough
explanation of CERCLA's legislative history and structure, see generally State of
New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1039-42 (2d Cir. 1985).
7. CERCIA section 101(20)(A)(ii) provides:
The term "owner or operator" means (ii) in the case of an onshore facility or an
offshore facility, any person owning or operating such facility. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(20)(A)(ii).
See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text for discussion of the "owner or
operator" definition.
8. CERCLA section 107(a)(1) & (2). For text of CERCLA section 107(a)(1)
& (2), see infra note 22.
9. See infra notes 42-81 and accompanying text for analysis of cases construing the terms "owner or operator".
10. Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155 (7th
Cir. 1988). See infra notes 82-102 and accompanying text for discussion of the
case.
11. Hines, 861 F.2d at 158-59.
12. This Note will discuss several United States Court of Appeals and
United States District Court opinions, as the United States Supreme Court has
not yet decided a case regarding CERCLA section 107.
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toxic waste' 3 dumps springing up across the nation. 14 Congress'
purpose in enacting the statute was twofold:' 5 first, to facilitate
prompt clean up of hazardous waste sites, 16 and; second, to fix
costs of the cleanup on responsible parties.' 7 CERCLA authorizes the EPA to identify sites18 where releases' 9 of hazardous
substances 20 have occurred, and assign those sites to the National
Priorities List (NPL). 2 ' Following appointment of a site to the
NPL, the EPA identifies potentially responsible parties 22 and or13. For purposes of this Note, the terms "toxic waste," "hazardous waste"
and "hazardous substances" are used interchangeably. See supra note 2 for the
definition of "hazardous substance" under CERCLA.
14. For an overview of CERCLA's legislative history see generally 126 Cong.
Rec. 26,336-61; Id. at 30,897-987; Id. at 31,950-82. See also Grad, A Legislative
History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. EirrL.L. 1 (1982).
15. H.R. Rep. No. 253(111), 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 15,'reprinted in 1986
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3038 (House Committee on the Judiciary).
Congressional intent in the creation of CERCLA is fully described in United
States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982):
First, Congress intended that the federal government be immediately given the tools necessary for a prompt and effective response to
problems of national magnitude resulting from hazardous waste disposal. Second, Congress intended that those responsible for problems
caused by the disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs and responsibility for remedying the harmful conditions they created.
Id.
16. See United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 903 (D.N.H. 1989);
FMC Corp. v. Northern Pump Co.,_668 F. Supp. 1285, 1289 (D. Minn. 1987);
United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn.
1982).
17. See Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. at 903; Pinole Point Properties v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 595 F. Supp. 282, 287 (N.D. Cal. 1984); State of Vermont v. Staco,
Inc., 684 F. Supp. 822, 831 (D. Vt. 1988); Northern Pump Co., 668 F. Supp. at
1289; Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. at 1112.
18. CERCLA section 103(d)(1) vests the EPA with authority to identify hazardous waste sites. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(d)(1). See supra note 4 for text of section.
19. The term "releases" include any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring,
emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment any pollution or contaminant. CERCLA § 101(22),
42 U.S.C. § 9601(22).
20. See supra note 2 for CERCLA's definition of a hazardous substance,
21. CERCLA § 105(a)(8)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(B). "To enable EPA
to respond to those sites most urgently in need of cleanup, EPA is required
under . . .42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(B), to compile the National Priorities List
(NPL) of releases or threatened releases" of hazardous substances. Eagle-Picher
Inddstries, Inc. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 922,926 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The EPA's task is to
determine the type and quantity of substance released and the potential for contamination and destruction of the environment, among other tasks. CERCLA
§ 103(d)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(d)(1). The site is then ranked according to the
potential risks to human health and the environment. Id. § 105, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9605.
22. CERCLA section 107 (a) imposes liability on four groups of persons:
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23
ders those parties to cleanup the site.

Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to
the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section (1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged
for disposal of treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport
for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed
by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing
such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances
for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or
sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a
hazardous substance, shall be liable for (A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the
United States Government or a State or an Indian Tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any
other person consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural
resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury,
destruction, or loss resulting from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study
carried out under section 9604(i) of this title.
The amounts recoverable in an action under this section shall include interest on the amounts recoverable under subparagraphs (A)
through (D). Such interest shall accrue from the later of (i) the date
payment of a specified amount is demanded in writing, or (ii) the date
of the expenditure concerned. The rate of interest on the outstanding
unpaid balance of the amounts recoverable under this section shall be
the same rate as is specified for interest on investments of the Hazardous Substance Superfund established under subchapter A of chapter 98
of Title 26. For purposes of applying such amendments to interest
under this subsection, the term "comparable maturity" shall be determined with reference to the date on which interest accruing under this
subsection commences.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
23. CERCLA section 106 authorizes the EPA to seek an injunction to force
a responsible party to cleanup a site that poses an imminent danger to public
health or the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 9606. If a private party refuses to conduct such a cleanup, CERCLA section 104(a)(l) authorizes the EPA to cleanup
the site:
Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a substantial threat of such a release into the environment, or (B) there is a
release or substantial threat of release into the environment of any pollutant or contaminant which may present an imminent and substantial
danger to the public health or welfare, the President is authorized to
act, consistent with the national contingency plan, to remove or arrange
for the removal of, and provide for remedial action relating to such
hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant at any time ... , or take
any other response measure consistent with the national contingency
plan which the President deems necessary to protect the public health
or welfare or the environment ....
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Liability Under CERCLA Section 107

25
CERCLA section 107(a) holds four groups 24 of "persons"
2
6
potentially liable for cleanup costs: present owners and operators of hazardous waste facilities, 2 7 past owners and operators of
facilities at the time of disposal, 28 generators of hazardous waste
who arrange for the transportation, disposal or treatment at a facility owned or operated by another person 29 and transporters of
hazardous waste.3 0 Responsible parties are subject to three types
of costs: costs incurred by the federal government in hazardous
waste site remediation, costs incurred by private parties to
cleanup a site, and damages to natural resources. The responsible party is held strictly liable3 l unless it can successfully raise one

42 U.S.C. § 104(a)(1).
The government may then seek reimbursement from the party responsible
for the waste disposal. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). This allows the
government to immediately cleanup the waste, and later shift financial responsibility to others. See e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1041
(2d Cir. 1985).
24. See supra note 22 for full text of the section.
25. CERCLA section 101(21) provides:
The term "person" means an individual, firm, corporation, association,
partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United
States Government, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body.

42 U.S.C. § 9601(21).
26. Under CERCLA, cleanup costs are referred to as "response costs."
"Response" is defined as "remove, removal, remedy and remedial action."

CERCLA § 101(25), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25).
27. Id. § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1). The term "facility" means "any
site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed
of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located ..
" Id. § 101(9), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(9). See supra note 22 for full text of section 107(a). This section holds
liable current owners and operators, regardless of whether they knew of the hazardous waste at the time of purchase. See, e.g., United States v. Maryland Bank &
Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986) (bank was held liable as responsible
party for lending money to hazardous waste facility).
28. CERCLA § 107(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2). The scope of this section
is more limited than section 107(a)(1). See supra note 22 for full text. This section insures that past owners and operators can not escape liability by selling
their properties. See also Comment, The Liability of FinancialInstitutionsfor Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs Under CERCLA, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 139, 152.
29. CERCLA § 107(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3). This section covers generators of hazardous waste who, by contract or agreement, arrange for the disposal of treatment of hazardous waste. See supra note 22 for full text.
30. CERCLA § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4). This section includes
persons who accept or have accepted hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels, or selected sites. See supra note
22 for full text.
31. Comment, The Liability of FinancialInstitutionsfor Hazardous Waste Cleanup
Costs Under CERCLA, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 139, 154.* "Congress intended that responsible parties be held strictly liable, even though an explicit provision for
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of the three affirmative defenses available within the statute: an
act of God, an act of war, and an act or omission of a third party
32
not an agent of the defendant.
The term "owner or operator" 33 as stated by CERCLA is
vague at best. To date, the United States Supreme Court has not
interpreted the issue of owner and operator liability under CERCLA. 34 Therefore, one must look to the lower federal courts for
judicial interpretation of owner and operator liability under section 107(a).3 5 In interpreting this statute, the federal courts have
reached quite different decisions regarding the definition of
"owner" and "operator." 36
The federal courts have been willing to extend liability beyond obviously responsible parties to those indirectly involved
with ownership, operation, generation, transportation or disposal
of hazardous substances.3 7 Given the broad scope of liability
strict liability was not included in the compromise." New York v. Shore Realty
Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985). Several federal courts have imposed
strict liability on responsible parties. See United States v. Conservation Chemical
Co., 589 F. Supp. 59 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Corp., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v.
Ward, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,127 (E.D.N.C. 1985); United States v.
Argent Corp., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,616 (D.N.M. 1984); United
States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 14 Envd. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 20,272 (D.S.C. 1984).
32. See CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) for full text of the section.
33. CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A). See supra note 7 for
text of statute. For purposes of this Note, "owner or operator" refers to the
term as stated in section 101(20)(A)(ii).
34. The United States Supreme Court has not interpreted CERCLA section
107(a), leading to inconsistent results among the lower federal courts, with
courts holding owners and operators liable depending on whether they interpret
the statute broadly or narrowly. See infra notes 42-81 and accompanying text.
35. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). See supra note 22 for full text of
this provision.
36. See United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162 (W.D.
Mo. 1985) (corporation that owned and operated site where hazardous wastes
were disposed of is among "covered persons" liable under section 107(a));
United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (parent corporation of subsidiary corporation responsible for hazardous waste disposal was
considered "owner and operator" of waste disposal site and was held liable
under section 107(a)). But c.f. FMC Corp. v. Northern Pump Co., 668 F. Supp.
1285 (D. Minn. 1987) (former owner of site on which toxic wastes were disposed
was not liable as "owner or operator" under CERCLA when corporation's subsidiary disposed of hazardous wastes); Cadillac Fairview/California, Inc. v. Dow
Chem. Co., 840 F.2d 691 (10th Cir. 1988) (past owners of land on which hazardous waste was disposed of, who did not participate in the disposal, were not
liable as "owners or operators" under section 9607(a)). See also infra notes 42-81
and accompanying text for discussion of other cases interpreting the terms of
"owner or operator."
37. See infra notes 42-81 and accompanying text.
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under section 107(a), past and current owners and operators have
little chance of escaping liability.38 However, depending upon
whether the courts have broadly39 or narrowly4o interpreted the
statute, they have reached different conclusions.
1. Liability of Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste
Sites
Increasingly, subsequent owners of hazardous waste sites
have been held liable for cleanup of contaminated sites, although
they are not the "generators" of the waste as stated by the statute.
In 1984, the United States District Court for the District of
New Mexico broadly interpreted section 107(a) 4 1 to hold a lessor
of property liable for his lessee's contamination of the property. 42
In United States v. Argent Corp.,43 the federal court denied the les-

sor's motion for summary judgment and held that a landowner/lessor may be held liable as an owner and operator under
CERCILA section 107(a). 44 The defendant, an individual property
owner, leased a warehouse to Argent Corporation, which utilized
hazardous substances in its business operations. 45 The defendant
argued that his ownership interest in the property, without any
38. Section 2 THE LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTE 12.03(6] (S. Cooke, ed.
1987). "It is reasonable to assume that on most liability issues under CERCLA,
defendants face a low likelihood of success, irrespective of the apparent merits
of their legal arguments." Id.
39. Courts that have broadly interpreted section 107(a) to find liability indude: United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md.
1986); Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568
(5th Cir. 1988); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985);
United States v. Carolawn, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2124 (June 15, 1984);
United States v. Argent Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1354 (May 4, 1984);
and United States v. Mottolo, 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1026 (March 27, 1984).
See infra notes 42-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
40. Other federal courts have read section 107(a) narrowly and have not
imposed liability. In United States v. Dart Industries, Inc., 847 F.2d 144 (4th
Cir. 1988), the 4th Circuit ruled that the South Carolina Department of Health
and Environmental Control (DHEC), a government agency, was not liable as an
owner or operator under section 107(a) when it gave a company waste disposal
permission. Id. The court reasoned that the DHEC was acting within its supervisory government powers, and thus could not be held liable. Id. at 146.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
42. United States v. Argent Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. 1354 (May 4, 1984).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1356. The issue in the case was whether the defendant-lessor may
be held liable for response costs for the lessee's contamination of the property.
Id. at 1355.
45. The manufacturer, Argent Corporation, used hazardous chemicals to
recover silver from used photographic film. Id. at 1355.
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involvement in the business, 46 did not bring him within the purview of section 107(a) 4 7 as a liable owner or operator.48 The district court disagreed, holding the defendant liable as an owner
under section 107(a),49 and basing its decision on case law precedent, 50 CERCLA's legislative history 5' and section 107(a)'s statutory language. 5 2 The court primarily relied on United States v.
South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc.,5s where a lower federal
court held a lessee that sublet part of its property to a waste disposal business liable for response costs. 54 That court reasoned,
and the Argent Corp. court agreed, that the lessee maintained con55
trol over the use of the property.
In Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc.,56 the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled, inter alia, that current parties 5 7 involved in a subdivision development were liable as owners
and operators under section 107(a). 58 The court imposed liability
notwithstanding the fact that a previous owner was responsible
59
for the accumulation of the hazardous waste on the property.
The court reasoned that section 107(a) does not specifically ex46. The defendant maintained that he had no connection at any time with
Argent Corporation's business. Id. at 1355. With no genuine issue of material
fact raised at trial, the defendant's contentions may be assumed true.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
48. Argent, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. at 1355-56.
49. Id. at 1356.
50. Id. at 1356. The court relied on United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., et al., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1577 (August 28, 1984)
and United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., Inc.,
(NEPACCO) 579 F. Supp. 823, 848 (W.D. Miss. 1984). For a discussion of
NEPACCO, see infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
51. Argent, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. at 1356. The court noted that the legislative
history of the statute showed language omitted from the proposed House version which would have required participation in management or operation as a
prerequisite to owner liability. Id.
52. Id. CERCLA section 107(a) explicitly holds owners or operators of a
hazardous waste facility liable, with no prerequisite of participation in management for a finding of liability. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
53. SCRDI, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1577 (August 28, 1984).
54. Id. at 1584. In SCRDI, the United States District Court for the District
of South Carolina held a lessee that sublet part of its property to a waste disposal
business liable for response costs. Id.
55. Id. at 1581. The court based its decision on section 107(a)(2) of CERCLA, and reasoned that the defendant, "as lessee of the site, maintained control
over and responsibility for the use of the property ..
" Id.
56. Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568
(5th Cir. 1988).
57. The defendants were a lending institution, residential developers, construction companies, real estate agents and real estate agencies. Id. at 1571.
58. Id. at 1572-73.
59. Id. The court denied defendants' motion to dismiss, rejecting their
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clude current owners of contaminated property from liability. 6
In so doing, the court interpreted section 107(a) broadly and extended potential liability to entities that have absolutely no involvement in the hazardous waste disposal. 6 '
In light of these decisions, ownership of a hazardous waste
disposal site is sufficient to find owner or operator liability under
CERCLA. This ownership may occur either at the time of dispo62
sal of the waste or at the time of cleanup.
2.

Liability of Corporate Officers as Owners and
Operators

Corporations may incur liability for hazardous waste disposal
as "persons" 63 under CERCLA section 107(a). 64 Recently, courts
have extended owner and operator liability to the officers of corporations involved in hazardous substance disposal. 65 This has
occurred because of a recognition that officers participate in the
disposal of hazardous waste by authorizing the generation or
contentions that they did not fall within the purview of section 107(a). Id. at
1574.
60. Id. at 1572. The court discussed United States v. Maryland Bank &
Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 1573 (D. Md. 1986), where a bank that held a mortgage
on a property and later bought the property at a foreclosure sale, was liable for
cleanup costs incurred from the previous owner's dumping on the property. Id.
at 1573.
61. In another case not relied on by the Hines court, a federal district court
broadly interpreted owner/operator liability under CERCLA. United States v.
Mirabile, 15 Envd. L. Rep. (Envd. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. 1985). The Mirabile
court ruled that a landowner who had purchased land subsequent to the disposal
of hazardous wastes was liable as an owner and operator under section 107(a).
Id. at 20,997. However, the court held that subsequent landowners may escape
liability if they are able to establish a third party defense under section
107(b)(3). Id.
62. CERCLA § 107(a) & (b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) & (b). However, it should
be noted that intervening landowners, owners of the land after disposal but
before cleanup, may be held liable under CERCLA. Under section 101 (35)(C),
as added by SARA, if an intervening landowner has "obtained actual knowledge
of a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance at such facility when
the defendant owned the real property, and then subsequently transferred ownership.., without disclosing such knowledge, such defendant shall be treated as
liable under section 9607(a)(1) and no defense under section 9607(b)(3) shall be
available to such defendant." Id. § 101(35)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(C).
63. For CERCLA's definition of "person", see supra note 25.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
65. Corporate officers have argued that their actions have been on the behalf of the corporation, and thus they are protected from liability under the doctrine of limited liability. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem.
Co., Inc. 579 F. Supp. 823, 847 (W.D. Miss. 1984). In some cases courts have
rejected this argument and imposed personal liability anyway. See notes 63-81
and accompanying text.
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transportation of hazardous waste.66
In United States v. Carolawn Co. ,67 the court maintained that
the three individuals who owned, operated and were officers of a
company operating a hazardous waste facility were liable under
section 107(a).6 The Federal District Court of South Carolina
denied defendants' motion for summary judgment and held defendants liable as owners of a hazardous waste site.69 In addition,
the court imposed further liability on two of the defendants based
on their role as operators of the facility.70 The court stated that
"to the extent an individual has control or authority over the activities of a facility from which hazardous substances are released
or participates in the management of such facility, he may be held
liable for responses incurred at the facility notwithstanding the
71
corporate character of the business."
The Second Circuit has ruled that a stockholder and officer
of a property can be liable as an operator under CERCLA. 72 In
New York v. Shore Realty Corp. ,7 the defendant, an officer and ma-

jor stockholder of a corporation which operated a hazardous
waste disposal site, argued that section 107(a) required a showing
of participation in the generation of hazardous waste to impose
liability, and thus he was not liable since the plaintiff failed to establish causation. 74 The court rejected the defendant's contentions and maintained that since the defendant knew hazardous
waste was stored on the site he should be held strictly liable as an
operator, regardless of the fact that he had not participated in the
75
generation or transportation of the waste.
66. United States v. Carolawn Co., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2124 (June
15, 1984).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 2130. The court ruled that unless one of the defendants could
assert a defense under section 107(b), they would be held liable. Id.
69. Id. The three individuals incorporated a company and thereafter
owned, operated and were officers of the company which disposed of hazardous
substances. Id.
70. Id. at 2131. The court found operator liability based on two theories:
first, corporate officials who participated in hazardous waste disposal are subject
to individual liability under section 107(a); and second, circumstances of the
case mandated piercing the corporate veil to reach the individuals and hold
them liable. Id.
71. Id.
72. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1044.
75. Id. at 1037. The court rejected the defendant's causation requirement
based on the structure of the statute and interpretation of legislative history.
The Shore court maintained that section 107(a)(1) "unequivocally imposes strict
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In United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical& Chemical Corp. ,76
the 8th Circuit reversed the District Court of Mississippi and held
that officers and shareholders of a chemical manufacturing company were not liable as "owners or operators" of a facility under
section 107(a)(1). 77 The district court had imposed liability on the
officers because of their authority over the plant and participation
in the management of the corporation. 78 The appeals court maintained that because the officers neither owned nor operated the
hazardous waste site, they could not be held liable under CERCLA.7 9 The court's holding is noteworthy, since many subsequent
courts based their findings of owner/operator liability on the
NEPACCO court's decision.
Since a "person" who may be held liable includes both individuals and corporations, ° courts have imposed liability on corporations. Moreover, some courts have extended this liability to
corporate officers, depending on the level of their involvement
with site activities. Ownership is not a prerequisite for imposing
liability on corporate officers; personal liability may be imposed
where an officer authorizes or participates in the disposal of haz81
ardous waste.
III.

HINES LUMBER CO. v. VULCAN MATERIALS CO.

In Hines, the Seventh Circuit held that a chemical supplier
was not liable as an "owner or operator" under CERCLA section
liability on the current owner of a facility from which there is a release or threat
of release, without regard to causation." Id. at 1044. Further, the court found
that "[C]ongress specifically rejected including a causation requirement in section 9607(a)." Id. Other courts have imposed strict liability on owners and operators of hazardous waste sites. See NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 743 ("CERCLA
§ 107(a)(3) ... imposes strict liability upon any person who arranged for the
disposal or transportation for disposal of hazardous substances."); Tanglewood
East Homeowners, 849 F.2d at 1572 ("We hold that section 9607(a)(1) imposes
strict liability on the current owners of any facility which releases or threatens to
release a toxic substance."). The Shore court also stated the landowner could
reasonably foresee the lessee's continued disposal of waste on the property, and
took no preventive action. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1049.
76. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., Inc., 579 F.
Supp. 823 (W.D. Miss. 1984).
77. NEPACCO, 810 F.2d 726, 742-43 (8th Cir. 1986).
78. NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. 823, 848.
79. NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 743.
80. See supra note 25 for definition of "person" under CERCLA.
81. See supra notes 63-81 and accompanying text. See also Vermont v. Staco,
Inc., 684 F. Supp. 822 (D. Vt. 1988) (managing stockholders, managing corporation and executive officers held liable for release of hazardous waste from plant).
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107(a). 2 From 1976 to 1978 the plaintiff, Edward Hines Lumber
83
Company (Hines Lumber), operated a wood processing plant.
Hines Lumber contracted with the defendant, Osmose Wood Preserving Inc. (Osmose), s4 to design a second plant for Hines Lumber, supply a wood preservant chemical to Hines Lumber, train
Hines Lumber's employees to operate the plant's equipment, and
license Hines Lumber to use its trademark.8 5 In 1981, the Arkansas Department of Pollution Control and Ecology discovered
toxic chemicals in the groundwater near the facility, and four
years later the EPA confirmed the finding.8 6 The EPA placed the
site on the National Priorities List 7 and ordered Hines Lumber
88
to remove the waste.
Hines Lumber brought an action for contribution under
CERCLA section 113(f)(1), 8 9 claiming Osmose was liable as an
82. Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155 (7th
Cir. 1988).
83. Id. at 156. Hines Lumber operated the plant from 1976 to 1978, at
which time it sold the plant to Mid-South Wood Products, Inc. (Mid-South) Id.
After the EPA placed the site on the National Priorities List, it asked both Hines
Lumber and Mid-South to conduct a cleanup, after which Hines Lumber instituted this action. Id. at 155.
84. All other defendants had settled or been adjudicated at the trial court
level. See Hines, 685 F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
85. Hines, 861 F.2d at 156. In return, Hines Lumber agreed to buy its next
five years' requirements of chromated copper arsenate from Osmose and gave
Osmose full access to the plant. Id. At all times, Hines Lumber controlled the
plant's daily operations and was in charge of employees, production and cost. Id.
at 158.
86. Id. at 156-57.
87. Id. at 155. The EPA placed the site on the National Priorities List pursuant to CERCLA section 105(a)(8)(B). 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(B).
88. Id. at 155. Hines Lumber and Mid-South signed a consent decree to
cleanup the site. By the time of trial the parties had almost completed the
cleanup at a cost of $5 million. Id. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text
for description of EPA's power to order a liable party to cleanup a hazardous
waste disposal site.
89. CERCLA section 113(f)(1) provides:
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable
or potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or following any civil action under section 9606 of this title or under section
9607(a) of this tide. Such claims shall be brought in accordance with
this section and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be governed by Federal law. In resolving contribution claims, the court may
allocate response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate. Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right of any person to bring an action for
contribution in the absence of a civil action under section 9606 or section 9607 of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1).
Hines Lumber first sued Osmose (and other chemical suppliers) for indemnification based on negligence and product liability claims. See Edward Hines Lumber
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owner or operator of the site.9° Hines Lumber relied on section
113(f)(1) which states that contribution costs may be sought from
"any other person who is liable or potentially liable under section
9607(a) of this title . .,,"91 Based on the foregoing section, the
court determined that Osmose's liability arose, if at all, under sec93
tion 10 7 (a)(2) 92 of CERCLA.
On appeal, the Hines court's primary task was to assess
whether Osmose was an "owner or operator" of the site within
the meaning of section 107(a)(2). 94 This section provides, in
part, that "any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated such facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of" must pay for a cleanup of
the facility. 95 The Hines court found the definition of "owner or
operator" ambiguous and sought to interpret the phrase using
96
another source.
The Hines court stated that Osmose was definitely not an
"owner," so it was potentially liable only if it was an "operator"
of the site. 9 7 The court turned to common law analogies to aid it
Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 669 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ill. 1987). The district court
found Hines Lumber's suit was untimely and granted the defendants' motion for
summaryjudgment. Id. at 855. In a subsequent suit in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Hines Lumber sought contribution
from the chemical suppliers for the cost of removing the contaminants. Hines,
685 F. Supp. 651. The district court held that Osmose was not a responsible
party under section 107(a)(2) and granted Osmose's motion for summary judgment. d. at 657. The present case is Hines Lumber's appeal from that
judgment.
90. Hines, 861 F.2d at 156. Hines Lumber also claimed Osmose was liable
under the theory of joint venturer. d. at 158. The court maintained that the
common law definition of joint venture has at least three elements which were
missing from the relationship between Hines Lumber and Osmose: 1) willingness to be joint venturers, 2) shared control, and 3) division of profits. Id. at 158.
The contract specifically stated that Osmose was not a joint venturer and assigned to Hines Lumber the responsibility for complying with environmental
rules. Id. In addition, under the contract Osmose had no right to share in the
profits and was not required to contribute to the losses. Id.
91. Id. at 156. See supra note 89 for complete text of section 113(0(1).
92. The courts use section 107(a) and section 9607(a) interchangeably.
93. Hines, 861 F.2d at 156.
94. Id. The court indicated that the issue in this case was "whether Osmose
'owned or operated' the Mena plant." Id. The court stated early in its decision
that Osmose was not an "owner" of the facility, therefore, potential liability
arose only if Osmose was an "operator." Id.
95. Id. See supra note 22 for full text of CERCLA section 107(a)(2).
96. Id. at 157. The court looked at section 101(20)(A)(ii) to define "owner
or operator", and concluded that the statutory definition was circular and therefore not helpful. Id.
97. Id.
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in its determination of "operator" liability 98 and analogized
Hines Lumber and Osmose's relationship to that of employer and
independent contractor.9" In an employer-independent contractor relationship, neither party is liable for the other's torts, and
the independent contractor is in charge of the day to day control
of its owner operations. 100 In Hines, Osmose was in control of its
own operations; however, the court found that Hines Lumber
controlled the day to day activities of the site. l0 1 The court concluded, based on analogy, that Hines Lumber was the owner and
operator of the plant, while Osmose was an independent

contractor. 102
IV. ANALYSIS
As discussed earlier, the majority of the federal courts have
construed section 107(a) to impose liability to parties indirectly
involved in the ownership or operation of a hazardous waste facility. 103 The Hines court's narrow holding is significant in that it is
one of few rulings that depart from the trend toward a broad interpretation of section 107(a).
The Hines court's dissatisfaction with CERCLA's ambiguous
definition of "owner or operator" is not unique; many courts that
have assessed "owner or operator" liability under CERCLA have
broadened the statute's application. 1' 4 Although the Hines decision was consistent with decisions of other courts in its dissatisfaction with the broad statutory construction of section 107(a), the
court's reasoning and conclusion are improper in light of other
05
courts' holdings and public policy considerations.1
98. Id. The court looked at several cases to aid in its determination of the
meaning of "operator" - United States v. Dart Industries, 847 F.2d 144 (4th
Cir. 1988), United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 810
F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d
Cir. 1985), and Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484 (D. Colo. 1985)
none of which it found helpful in assessing the status of Osmose. Hines, 861
F.2d at 156.
99. Id. The court also analogized Hines Lumber and Osmose to co-venturers. See supra note 90 for Hines Lumber's cause of action based on joint venturer
theory.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 158. Hines Lumber had day to day control over employee hiring
and dismissal, production quantities, sale location and product pricing. Id.
102. Id.
103. See supra notes 42-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of court
decisions defining the terms "owner or operator."
104. Id.
105. See infra notes 114-17 and accompanying text for discussion of public
policy considerations.
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The Hines court indicated that as long as Osmose had not
participated in the day to day operation of the facility, it could not
be held liable as an "operator" under CERCLA. 10 6 Other courts
have rejected this restrictive prerequisite when determining a potentially responsible party's liability under section 107(a).10 7 In
Hines the court only focused on whether the chemical supplier was
directly and actively involved with the daily operations of the facility. Because Hines Lumber controlled all daily operations
through management decisions, such as the hiring and firing of
employees, production quantity and product cost, the court concluded that Hines Lumber, and not Osmose, was the "operator"
of the facility. 108 However, the court disregarded several relevant
facts. Osmose built the hazardous waste disposal facility, trained
Hines Lumber's employees in the use of the equipment, reserved
the right to inspect ongoing operations, and authorized Hines
Lumber to use its trademark.' 0 9 Most importantly, Osmose continually furnished the hazardous chemical that Hines Lumber uti-

lized in it manufacturing process, and agreed to supply Hines
Lumber's chemical requirements for the next five years. 10
By turning owner/operator liability on whether Osmose had
participated in the management of the facility, the court departed
from other federal court analyses."' Despite the factual differences in the federal cases, certain themes determining liability
have emerged. First, courts have usually imposed liability based
106. Hines, 861 F.2d at 158.
107. Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d
1568 (5th Cir. 1988) (parties involved in subdivision development held liable as
owners and operators for previous owner's hazardous waste disposal); New York
v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985) (officer and major stockholder of corporation which operated hazardous waste site held liable as an operator); United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., et al., 21
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1577 (August 28, 1984) (lessee that sublet part of its
property to waste disposal business held liable for response costs); United States
v. Carolawn Co., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2124 (June 15, 1984) (three individuals who owned, operated and were officers of a company operating a hazardous
waste facility held liable as owners and operators); United States v. Argent
Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. 1354 (May 4, 1984) (landowner/lessor held liable as
owner and operator for lessee's contamination of property). See supra notes 4177 and accompanying text for a full discussion of these cases.
108. Hines, 861 F.2d at 158.
109. Id. at 157. The court discussed these facts, but found they were insufficient to establish that Osmose was an "operator" of the site, within the meaning of section 107(a). Id.
110. Id.
111. See supra notes 42-81 and accompanying text for other federal court
analyses.
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upon operational control rather than ownership. 1 2 Second, participation in management has not solely determined operational
control; other factors, such as nature of the relationship between
the parties, awareness of waste disposal and position of the individual sought to be held liable have also been considered in del5
termining a potentially liable party."
In assessing Osmose's liability, the Hines court failed to consider public policy goals of corrective justice, compensation, and
deterrence." 14 One of CERCLA's most important goals is to affix
liability on those parties responsible for damage."15 This "polluter-pays" approach reflects a goal of corrective justice. 1 6 The
court also failed to recognize the importance of compensating
Hines Lumber for the damage caused by the hazardous chemical
supplied by Osmose. The shift of the burden of cleanup costs
from the "victim" to the potentially responsible party under CERCILA indicates the compensatory function of the statute. Finally,
CERCLA's liability provisions serve a deterrent function. If a
party knows it may be held liable for cleanup costs, it may exercise stricter control over its actions so as to minimize hazardous
waste liability." 17
The Hines court based its determination that Osmose was not
a potentially responsible party on its limited participation in the
site's daily management. However, the court failed to take into
account relevant factors discussed by other federal courts,1 18 as
well as important public policy considerations. In so doing, the
court's analysis was incomplete, and undermined CERCLA's policy goals.
112. Clark, Pendygraft, Plews, and Wright, Who Pays for Environmental Damage: Recent Developments in CERCLA Liability and Insurance Company Litigation, 21
IND. L. REV. 117, 131 (1988).

113. See supra notes 42-81 and accompanying text.
114. See Note, The Inapplicability of Traditional Tort Analysis to Environmental
Risks: The Example of Toxic Waste Pollution Victims Compensation, 35 STAN. L. REV.
575, 593 (1983).
115. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
116. See Note, The Inapplicabilityof Traditional Tort Analysis to Environmental
Risks: The Example of Toxic Waste Pollution Victims Compensation, 35 STAN. L. REV.

575, 593 (1983). This corrective justice theory bases liability on causation. Id.
See Epstein, A Theoy of Strict Liability, 2J. LEGAL SrUD. 151, 160-89 (1973). See,
e.g., S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1980) ("[T]hose who cause chemical harm [should] bear the costs of that harm ..
").
117. See Note Developments in the Law - Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1459, 1513 (1986).
118. See supra notes 42-81 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

Congress enacted CERCLA in response to the growing hazardous waste disposal problem by placing liability and cleanup
costs on parties responsible for such disposal. CERCLA authorizes the EPA to identify a potentially responsible party and order
that party to cleanup a hazardous waste site. 1 9 A responsible
20
party may be an individual or a corporate officer.'
Given that the majority of federal courts have interpreted
section 107 broadly, a current or past owner or operator of a hazardous waste facility has little chance of escaping liability. 12 1 In
addition, as the public has become increasingly aware of the
growing problem of toxic waste disposal, courts have been more
willing to broadly interpret the statute. The federal caselaw discussed in this Note demonstrates that courts are willing to expand
the scope of liability under section 107 and hold a larger group of
parties potentially liable for cleanup, even in cases where their
22
contact with the site has been minimal.
This expanded liability is beneficial to parties seeking redress, as it places the cost of cleanup on those responsible for the
problem. However, interpreting section 107 broadly presents difficulties. First, businesses will be held liable, even if only distantly
related to the waste disposal activity. This in turn may result in
fewer businesses participating in ventures where hazardous
wastes are involved. The fear of being held liable as an "owner or
operator" of a facility may outweigh the potential business benefits, since full exposure to liability could place a company's entire
assets at risk.
A second, but related problem is section 107's ambiguity.
CERCLA's definition of "owner or operator" is ambiguous and
courts have interpreted the phrase in different ways, leading to
inconsistent results and lack of predictability. This inconsistency
makes it difficult for a business to conduct its affairs because it is
unsure how a court may interpret its activities, with respect to potential causes of action under CERCLA.
To avoid future interpretational problems, it is submitted
that section 107 (a) be amended to more clearly define "owner or
operator." This definition should specifically state the extent to
which an entity must be involved in the ownership or operation of
119.
120.
121.
122.

See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 63-81 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 42-81 and accompanying text.
Id.
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a facility before liability as a responsible party may be imposed. 123
In redefining the statute, the purposes of CERCILA - prompt
and efficient cleanup of hazardous waste sites and imposition of
liability on responsible parties 24 - would be better served.
Jill E. Aversa
123. In determining the extent of involvement necessary to impose liability,
many factors must be considered. These factors may include whether the individual or corporation sought to be held liable as an owner or operator actively
participates in decision-making and has knowledge of decisions involving hazardous waste disposal, among others.
124. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
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